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I. INTRODUCTION
Those involved in peace negotiations often face the dilemma of 
balancing demands for justice with the imperative of stopping the conflict 
as quickly as possible.  There are abiding ethical and moral debates 
surrounding this tension between peace and justice. In Syria—where the 
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death toll has exceeded 470,000, 11 million have been displaced, and there 
are over 14,000 documented cases of death by torture1—the peace versus 
justice puzzle is a living dilemma with which those involved in the peace 
process grapple with on a daily basis.
Is it morally permissible to allow conflict (and the attendant human 
suffering) to continue, so as to advance the possibility of achieving justice
in the form of accountability against the perpetrators of the violence?  
Alternatively, if justice is set aside to achieve peace more rapidly, and
accountability is delayed or even prevented, is the resulting harm (including 
a possible return to conflict) acceptable? The debate between peace and 
justice lives in delegation meetings, offices of legal advisors, foreign
ministries, and state governments.  In the midst of a crisis, negotiators and 
those who advise them often must confront the tradeoff between peace and 
justice.  Indeed, the questions being debated in the Syrian peace process 
reflect this lingering puzzle that negotiators have grappled with for decades.  
Individuals must determine their priorities in this regard and create a 
pragmatic strategy towards achieving that outcome. It is important to 
understand the primary tenants of the peace versus justice puzzle in order 
for those involved in a particular peace process to best solve this puzzle.
This article does not propose to answer the weighty question of which 
approach best resolves the conundrum of peace and justice, nor does the 
article intend to recommend a solution to the complex intricacies of 
attempting to merge the two together.  Rather, this article strives to examine 
a timely facet of this multidimensional puzzle: how to successfully 
accommodate the desire for justice by artfully weaving tenets of
accountability into a peace process, without undermining a peace process.  
One answer to this pressing question is that the best method is to avoid 
justice in the peace process altogether.  This is the peace-first approach.  
Another, competing answer, is that the most salient choice is to treat justice 
as a foundational building block of the peace process.  This is the justice-
first approach.  There is also a third answer, which suggests that the most 
effective method for solving the puzzle is to strike a delicate blend of 
justice with peace.
As illustrated by the experiences of a rich array of countries that have 
grappled with these questions, there is no clear consensus on the degree of 
justice that ought to be brought in to a peace process, nor when and how
justice ought to be introduced.  There is, however, a clearer sense that 
however these questions are ultimately resolved, there should be at least a 
modicum of justice.  Although there is an increasing trend towards a
                                                                       
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016 571 (2017), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT:
EVENTS OF 2016].
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holistic role of justice in the peace process, the question of “how much 
justice” remains unresolved.
The Syrian conflict provides a particularly useful foil in examining 
this puzzle.  After initial uncertainty as to which approach would take 
primacy in the Syrian peace process, the failure of pivotal efforts to 
introduce accountability measures at the United Nations (U.N.) Security 
Council placed the conflict squarely with the peace-first approach.  Since 
then, however, actors have persistently pursued efforts to weave in justice 
into the peace process, through efforts to document violations, to lay the 
foundation for victim catharsis, and to engage in new and creative options 
for prosecutorial activity.
This article will first explore the peace-first approach: the priorities of
the supporters of this approach, the potential advantages to pursuing peace-
first, and case studies of peace processes that have successfully and 
unsuccessfully followed this approach.  Next, this article will examine the 
justice-first approach in a similar manner. After analyzing the assumed 
dichotomy between peace and justice, the article will explore the potential
(although limited) overlap between these two approaches, identifying the 
perspective that justice and peace may be compatible in cases where justice 
is artfully woven into peace. The article will also identify the limitations to 
this approach. Finally, the article will contextualize the peace versus justice 
puzzle, with reference to the Syrian conflict. Through an exploration of 
each of these topics, the article seeks to examine the puzzle of 
accommodating a drive for accountability, without undermining the ability 
of the parties to halt a conflict.
II. THE “PEACE-FIRST” APPROACH
“The quest for justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in 
such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead of tomorrow.”
Anonymous United Nations Official2
The peace-first approach can best be understood by first understanding 
the general perspective and priorities of the approach and then diving 
deeper to examine how the approach is implemented in practice.  This 
section will begin by discussing the tenants of the peace-first approach and 
identifying the primary categories of practitioners that support it.  Next, the 
section will explore the advantages of the peace-first approach in peace 
processes. The section will then focus on actions that can be taken to 
implement the peace-first approach in the peace process.  Finally, to 
illuminate the nuances of the approach, this section will explore the case
                                                                       
2. Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 258 (1996) 
[hereinafter Human Rights in Peace Negotiations].
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studies of South Africa, Bougainville, and Yemen and how the peace-first 
approach manifested in each context.
A. Prioritizing Ending the Conflict
As suggested by its name, the peace-first approach prioritizes ending 
the conflict above all other interests.3 The singular role of negotiators is to 
seek an agreement that brings the most immediate end to the violence.4 All 
other goals and concerns that may impede immediate peace should be 
pushed aside.  In this way, the approach is single-minded and pragmatic:  
peace is the priority and any obstacle to peace should be avoided or 
eliminated.
There is a tension between ideal outcomes in peace processes and the 
outcomes that parties are in fact able to agree to at that moment.5 The 
peace-first approach will always opt for the latter—the most immediate 
resolution of the conflict should be pursued.6 Rather than allowing the 
violence to continue while negotiators pursue a more ideal resolution, 
ceasing the violence takes precedence.  Indeed, achieving justice against 
individuals and parties that committed atrocities during the conflict may be 
a goal of some parties in the peace process, but it may not be possible to 
achieve peace while also pursuing justice.7 As with any other interest, if 
the pursuit of justice will prolong the conflict, justice should not be sought.8
The peace-first approach is often associated with parties to the peace 
process who have committed atrocities, with the aggressor and frequently
with mediators.  The peace negotiator’s role is to end the conflict, not to 
assume the role of a prosecutor and assign responsibility or call for justice.9
As articulated by United States (U.S.) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke—a
key figure in mediating the Bosnia’s Dayton Accords—when asked as to 
why he continuously declined to indicate Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic's guilt for the war and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,10
                                                                       
3. Id. at 251.
4. Id. at 255–56.
5. Id. at 249, 252.
6. See id. at 252.
7. I. William Zartman, Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, in PEACE 
VERSUS JUSTICE: NEGOTIATING FORWARD-AND BACKWARD-LOOKING OUTCOMES 1, 6 (I. William 
Zartman & Victor Kremenyuk eds., 2005).
8. Id.
9. Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
10. Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the Peace-
Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161, 186 (2003).͒
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:2422
“[t]his is tough slogging, and my job was not to make moral judgments, [ . . 
. ] and the highest goal here was to avoid war and bring peace.”11
B. Benefits of the Peace-First Approach
The peace-first approach’s prioritization of ending the conflict has
advantages. Bringing immediate peace saves lives and ends human 
suffering. 12 Additionally, peace ends harm to the environment and
destruction of infrastructure, which are by-products of the conflict, and 
reconstruction efforts may begin sooner. 13 The focus on peace also 
encourages national reconciliation and social reconciliation.14
1. Saving Lives
Ending the conflict as soon as possible results in lives being saved and 
human suffering ceasing more rapidly.  Pursuing objectives other than 
peace may prolong the conflict and thus result in more casualties and harm.
Although atrocities may have been committed, ending the conflict as
quickly as possible prevents more from occurring.15
2. Ending Harm to the Environment and Infrastructure
Conflicts have disastrous impacts on the natural environment and 
infrastructure. Achieving peace not only ends the harm being caused to the 
environment and infrastructure, but also allows reconstruction efforts to 
begin in the state sooner than if the conflict was to continue.  By 
prioritizing peace, the natural environment can be protected and efforts to 
heal it can be initiated.  Additionally, prioritizing peace allows the state and 
its people to begin rebuilding its infrastructure—such as homes, hospitals, 
schools, roads, and power supplies—sooner. More immediate 
                                                                       
11. Hearings on the Nomination of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke to Serve as U.S. Ambassador 
to the United Nations:  Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel. U.S. Sen., 106th Cong. 101–02 
(1999) (statement of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke).
12. Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 250.
13. U.N., Dep’t of Econ & Soc. Affairs, Peacebuilding Support Off., Peacebuilding 
Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned, Economic Revitalization in Peacebuilding and the 
Development of Service Based Infrastructure 1, 4 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/
pdf/doc_wgll/desa_pbso_background_paper.pdf [hereinafter Revitalization in Peacebuilding].
14. See Orlaith Minogue, Peace vs. Justice:  The Utility of Amnesties, 29 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
306, 308 (2010); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, 
and A Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 304–06 (2005).
15. See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 258.
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reconstruction in turn prevents the compounding of harmful byproducts of 
the conflict, such as lack of access to medical attention or education.16
3. Promoting Reconciliation
Achieving peace without pursuing justice can lead to national and 
social reconciliation.  Undertaking prosecutions can allow animosity 
between the national and societal factions to continue to fester.  Granting 
amnesty and achieving peace may instead lead to forgiveness and 
reconciliation. 17 Offering amnesty can encourage “gestures of 
reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the 
life of a nation which has been divided.”18
C. Achieving Peace-First in Practice
There are a number of diplomatic tools available to pursue a peace-
first approach.  These include limiting peace negotiation participants to 
those with the ability to actually end the violence (the guys with guns so to 
speak); accommodating and at times appeasing those interests, minimizing 
the role of justice mechanisms; and at times providing blanket amnesty.
1. Singular Objective of Ending the Conflict
To achieve peace, it is necessary to be singularly focused on ending 
the conflict.  The focus of any agreement is a cessation of hostilities 
coupled with subsequent demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration 
of combatants.19 Where necessary some sort of power sharing arrangement 
can be established to induce the parties to cease hostilities.20 The mandate 
and means for deploying peacekeepers or monitors is also a priority, and 
the establishment of some mechanisms to coordinate international 
assistance for reconstruction.  The mediators and the parties must resist
pressure to expand their mandate to include topics such as deep 
constitutional or electoral reform (beyond creating a framework or process 
                                                                       
16. Revitalization in Peacebuilding, supra note 13, at 4, 7–8.
17. Newman, supra note 14, at 304.
18. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C6692EB184B
56F56C12563CD0043A476 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (discussing the purpose of Additional Protocol 
II’s amnesty provision).
19. See Johannes Langer et al., Peace v. Justice:  The Perceived and Real Contradictions of 
Conflict Resolution and Human Rights, in 8 CRITERIOS - CUADERNOS DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS Y 
POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL 165, 167 (2015) (Colom.).
20. Id.
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for some future progress on these issues), the creation of new human rights 
bodies, and most certainly the establishment of complicated mechanisms 
for accountability. 21 The mediators and the parties must avoid the 
temptation to be diverted or tempted to use the peace process to create a 
modern inclusive democratic state.22 That is the task of the parties—with 
assistance from the international community—only after the conflict has 
ended.
2. Negotiating with the Guys with Guns
To end a conflict, it is necessary to induce those actively engaged in 
the conflict to cease hostilities.  It is not necessary to have the consent of 
civil society, refugees, internally displaced persons, marginalized 
populations, and women (unless they are armed actors).  Including non-
armed actors distracts from the ability of the mediator to navigate the 
interests of the armed actors and creates space to introduce issues unrelated 
to bringing about an immediate end to the conflict.  Only on the rarest
occasions do armed combatants place accountability on the table as a key 
interest.  Likely this is because anyone engaged in armed activity perceives 
that they may be brought before a tribunal; especially in light of the morally 
equivalent approach of seeking to “hold all sides accountable” even when 
one party is responsible for the overwhelming majority of atrocities. Only 
armed combatants should be at the negotiation table, and the mediator 
should engage exclusively with their interests.
3. Accommodation and Appeasement
Frequently it is necessary to accommodate or even appease the 
interests of the armed actors.  While there is an emerging global consensus 
on issues such as democratic reform and the protection of human rights, 
these are seldom the objectives of all the major armed groups participating 
in the conflict.  At times one of the armed groups is interested in promoting 
the demise of a repressive regime or defending a marginalized population 
from oppression.  At other times the armed group is just interested in “their 
turn at the table” of corruption and repression.
There is always one major armed group—often the government—that
is interested in retaining the status quo, and it is unlikely that the status quo
is a democratic and human rights-respecting political structure.  Frequently,
it is in the interest of one or more of the armed groups to avoid 
accountability for any crimes that may have been committed by it or its
                                                                       
21. Id.
22. Id. at 177.
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forces during the conflict.23 Given that nearly every conflict in the past few 
decades involved the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity 
by at least one of the armed actors, there is little appetite for accountability.  
It is the job of the mediator to find a way to embrace the political reality 
and accommodate these less than ideal or altruistic interests to get the 
armed actors to cease the killing.24
4. Minimizing Justice
To accommodate or appease the armed actors it is often, if not always, 
necessary to minimize the creation of any mechanisms of justice that may 
be used to hold the armed actors accountable for war crimes.25 Who, after 
all, would sign an agreement that might bring an end to a conflict, only to 
find that he will be tried for war crimes, delegitimized in the eyes of his
community, and incarcerated, preventing him from enjoying the fruits 
(legitimate or otherwise) of his armed actions?
In fact, recent statistical research indicates that for conflicts between 
2002 and 2013, the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in a conflict significantly decreased the probability of reaching a timely end 
to the conflict.26 The author of this research points out that the pursuit of 
justice may undermine peace by “threatening leaders’ political survival and 
personal freedom.”27 Moreover, an armed party may also be incentivized to 
continue the conflict to make the gathering of evidence against them more 
difficult.28 Even justice-based mechanisms that are not prosecutorial, like 
truth commissions, should be avoided because they may also prolong 
negotiations and the conflict.  The mediators must always remember that no 
matter how morally appealing it may be to create accountability for war 
crimes, assigning responsibility or punishing bad acts is not the purpose of 
the peace process—the only concern is ending the conflict.29
                                                                       
23. Id. at 170–71.
24. See Langer et al., supra note 19, at 170–71.
25. Id. at 170.
26. Alyssa K. Prorok, The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice?  The International Criminal 
Court and Civil Conflict Termination, 71 INT’L ORG. 213, 214–15 (2017).
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id. at 222 (prohibiting evidence gathering undermines investigators’ ability to develop 
sufficient evidence to start a case).
29. See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
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5. Amnesty
In addition to minimizing the creation of accountability mechanisms, it
may be necessary to simply agree upon a blanket or conditional amnesty.30
Because actors may be unwilling to step down from power or cease 
hostilities so long as they or their associates face the possibility of
punishment, amnesties may be leveraged as a trade-off.31 In some instances 
there may be no alternative to granting amnesty as a precondition, so as to 
end the conflict more rapidly.32 While morally unappealing, so is the 
prospect of the further loss of life. Amnesty has been an integral part of 
numerous peace agreements, including Bougainville, 33 Sierra Leone, 34
South Africa,35 and Yemen.36
D. Case Studies
The peace-first approach has been tried and implemented in many 
conflicts.  South Africa is often used as the archetype of success for the 
approach and the model of the benefits of prioritizing peace.37 In 1948, the 
white National Party became the governing party of South Africa.38 The 
party consolidated its power and instituted the statewide program of 
                                                                       
30. PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR CRIMES AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 29 (2002).
31. Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice:  Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the 
International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 495 (2003).
32. Minogue, supra note 14, at 307.
33. Amnesty:  Bougainville Peace Agreement, Art. 331, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 
2018) [hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement]; Amnesty:  Lincoln Agreement, Art. 10, PEACE 
ACCORDS MATRIX, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Lincoln Agreement].
34. Amnesty:  Lomé Peace Agreement, Art. IX, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-lom-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
35. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., art. 251, 1993.
36. AMNESTY INT’L, YEMEN’S IMMUNITY LAW: BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
11 (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde310072012en.pdf; Yemen:  
Amnesty for Saleh and Aides Unlawful, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:55 PM), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2012/01/23/yemen-amnesty-saleh-and-aides-unlawful [hereinafter Yemen].
37. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security,
FUNDACIÓN PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR [FRIDE]
[FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN DIALOGUE] 1, 7 (2007), 
http://fride.org/descarga/south.africa.comment.pdf.
38. NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CONQUEST, APARTHEID,
DEMOCRACY 102–04 (5th ed. 2012) (1994).
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apartheid, or racial segregation for the promotion of white interests. 39
Political violence during the apartheid era led to approximately 75,000 
people detained without trial, widespread torture, and 21,000 deaths, with
14,000 of these deaths occurring between 1990 to 1994.40
Negotiations between the all-white apartheid South African 
government and the anti-apartheid political parties, including the African 
National Congress (ANC), resulted in the 1993 interim constitution of 
South Africa, which formed the foundation for the first non-racial general 
elections in South Africa.41 The interim constitution included an amnesty
clause providing that all persons and parties shall be granted amnesty for 
“acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past” through a mechanism 
determined by the newly elected Parliament.42 This provision laid the 
foundation for a mechanism to determine conditional amnesties.  The
express purpose of the amnesty was to advance national “reconciliation and 
reconstruction.”43 Notably, key party negotiators, such as Dullah Omar, the 
ANC representative and future South African Minister of Justice, have 
confirmed that a peace agreement would not have been reached without the 
amnesty clause in the interim constitution.44
After elections, in 1995 the Parliament passed a law establishing the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 45 The Truth Commission was 
designed to give effect to the amnesty clause in the constitution by granting 
amnesty to all persons who made a “full disclosure of all the relevant facts 
relating to acts associated with a political objective committed in the
                                                                       
39. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 187–90 (3d ed. 2001) 
(recounting the institutionalization of the apartheid era in South Africa by the National Party through 
consolidation of resources and legislative activities); see also RODNEY DAVENPORT & CHRISTOPHER 
SAUNDERS, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN HISTORY 379–83 (5th ed. 2000) (describing the National 
Party’s dominance in government and removal of the coloured vote to prevent any dilution of this 
power).
40. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. OF S. AFR., A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: ANALYSING THE 
REPRESSION OF THE APARTHEID STATE (Max Coleman ed., 1998).
41. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993; see Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National 
Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 757–58 (1998) (enumerating the 
specific voting changes made by the 1993 Constitution that would allow for the first multi-racial 
election in South African history).
42. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993.
43. Id.
44. LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL?
59 (2002).
45. Id.
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course” of apartheid.46 While not without controversy, most commentators 
consider the amnesty-based peace process to have been successful in 
bringing an end to the South African conflict and laying the foundation for 
a lasting peace.47
Another conflict where a peace-first approach prevailed during the 
peace process was the Bougainville civil war, fought between the 
government of Papua New Guinea and the region of Bougainville.48 In this 
case the parties agreed upon an unconditional blanket amnesty.49 The 
brutal civil war between the government of Papua New Guinea and the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army lasted nearly a decade and resulted in the 
deaths of 15,000 to 20,000 civilians and fighters—ten percent of the 
Bougainville population.50 The conflict was characterized by war crimes 
and atrocities, including razing villages and attacks on civilians by the 
government, and rape and torture by both parties.51 The peace agreements, 
which rendered a plan for Bougainville to become an autonomous entity 
with the right to eventual hold an independence referendum, included a
provision that granted “amnesty and pardon” to all persons involved in 
crisis-related activities or convicted of offenses arising out of crisis-related 
activities. 52 Despite a relative failure to fully implement the peace 
agreement, the amnesty is generally considered to have successfully moved 
Bougainville into a period of lasting peace.53
The ongoing conflict in Yemen has also seen attempts to resolve the 
conflict using a peace-first approach.  The conflict began in 2011 when,
caught up in the momentum of the Arab Spring, Yemeni students rose up 
demanding social change.54 What started as a peaceful protest demanding 
improved living conditions and jobs turned violent when government 
                                                                       
46. Promotion of National United and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (2005), http://www.
justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf (S. Afr.).
47. See, e.g., Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties A Second Chance, 25 BERKLEY J.
INT’L L. 283, 293, 295, 314 (2007).
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security forces killed fifty-two protestors. 55 This event fractured the 
government with many generals, ambassadors, and government leaders 
defecting. 56 Government security forces targeted and killed anti-
government organizers, summarily executing demonstrators, arbitrarily 
detaining persons of interest, performing acts of torture, and treating 
civilians to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.57 Within a year, over 
2000 people had been killed and more than 22,000 injured.58
With the conflict turning in the favor of the opposition, the Gulf Co-
operation Council stepped in to negotiate an end to hostilities and a transfer 
of power agreement. 59 The peace agreement brokered by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and approved by the U.N. approved peace deal,
provided immunity for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his 
aides.60 The agreement—President Saleh signed in November 2011 and the 
sitting Yemeni Parliament passed granted immunity to Saleh from 
prosecution for any crimes during his thirty-three-year tenure. 61
Specifically, the peace agreement provided that President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh was entitled to “complete immunity from legal and judicial 
prosecution” for any acts that occurred during his presidency and until the 
date the law was passed.62 The agreement also shielded from prosecution 
those who served under Saleh, by providing that immunity is granted to 
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Yemenis during the year of the Yemen Revolution).
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“officials who have worked under the President—in state civil, military and 
security agencies—in connection to politically motivated acts carried out 
during the course of their official duties[.]”63 In exchange, Saleh was to 
leave office within thirty days, transferring power to his Vice President.64
Yemen is in the midst of a brutal civil war, and until recently it was 
President Saleh who co-led a coalition rebelling against the government 
installed by the peace agreement.65 There is nearly unanimous agreement 
among commentators that the amnesty played a key role in permitting the 
former President to retain his political influence and plot a return to power 
through civil war.66
III. THE “JUSTICE-FIRST” APPROACH
“If you want peace, work for justice.”
Pope Paul VI67
The justice-first approach will be explored in a similar format to the 
previous section on the peace-first approach.  First, the tenants of the 
justice-first approach and the primary categories of practitioners that 
support it will be identified.  Next, the section will explore the advantages 
of taking a justice-first approach in peace processes.  The section will then 
focus on actions that can be taken to implement the justice-first approach in 
the peace process.  Finally, the section will examine the case studies of 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan.
A. Prioritizing Accountability
The “justice-first” approach advances the notion that accountability 
through prosecution must be an integral aspect of any negotiated agreement
or post-conflict plan.68 While the justice-first approach does seek peace, the 
approach supports the idea that quick peace should not come at the cost of 
the pursuit of justice.69 While peace may be achieved temporarily through a 
peace-first approach, durable, long-term peace cannot be achieved without 
justice.  Although insisting upon accountability mechanisms may prolong 
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the conflict, the eventual peace that is created is more likely to be 
sustainable. The justice-first approach is willing to cope with a longer 
conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace.
The justice-first approach has garnered much support.  Victims 
frequently demand a retributive approach towards perpetrators due to the 
grave nature of human rights violations.70 Parties to a conflict who have 
disproportionately suffered crimes at the hand of the opposing party 
generally support the justice-first approach, as do individual victims. 71
Additionally, many states, particularly those who helped found the ICC and 
who have ratified the Rome Statute, tend to promote a justice-first approach 
to peacemaking.72 Countless international non-government organizations 
(NGOs) are dedicated to promoting justice for crimes committed and to 
preparing for future prosecutions or other justice mechanisms, and even 
more NGOs not directly involved have taken a firm stance that justice 
should be an inextricable part of peacemaking.73
B. Benefits of the Justice-First Approach
With the formalization of international laws on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and other atrocities as well as the establishment of 
prosecutorial mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable, the justice-first 
approach recognizes that this progress is meaningless if justice is waived.  
Furthermore, the justice-first approach asserts that the implementation of 
justice mechanisms assists in creating stable peaceful societies in post-
conflict states. Justice mechanisms promote this by establishing individual 
responsibility and denying collective guilt, delegitimizing institutions and 
war criminals responsible for the commission of atrocities, establishing an 
accurate historical record, providing victim catharsis, and promoting 
deterrence.74
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72. See Catherine Gegout, The International Criminal Court:  Limits, Potential and 
Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 800, 800 (2013).
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1. Denying Collective Guilt
If justice is not pursued, guilt may be assigned to an entire population
rather than the individuals responsible for the crimes. 75 Additionally, 
because justice mechanisms attach responsibility to specific persons, they 
lessen the risk that victims and third parties will view an entire group or 
population as to blame for the harm. 76 By avoiding a perception of 
collective guilt, a post-conflict society may reconcile and heal.
2. Delegitimizing Institutions and War Criminals
Justice mechanisms delegitimize institutions and leaders responsible 
for the commission of atrocities.  Justice can advance a sustainable end to 
conflict by punishing perpetrators and removing wrongdoers from 
leadership and delegitimizing their ideology. 77 Furthermore, justice 
mechanisms identify the institutions responsible for crimes and helps
provide a basis for dismantling them.78
3. Establishing an Accurate Historical Record
Justice mechanisms can establish an accurate historical record of the 
conflict, which contributes to long-term peace.  The “collective historical 
record” that prosecutions produce provides legitimacy to the new post-
conflict government while delegitimizing the former regime. 79 Such a 
record also allows societies to learn from the past, have a mutual 
understanding of the actions of all parties, and move towards communal 
reconciliation based on a shared understanding of the truth.80
4. Facilitating Victim Catharsis
Holding violators accountable through justice mechanisms facilitates 
victim catharsis. Enduring peace requires justice and accountability 
because when the underlying cause of a conflict goes unaddressed and 
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victims do not receive redress, the risk of returning to conflict remains 
high.81 This is particularly true when perpetrators of violence or human 
rights abuses are granted amnesty and therefore escape punishment.  In the 
absence of formal justice the victims and other individuals who feel 
wronged may engage in extrajudicial means to achieve justice, including 
violence.82 Through trials, victims are also able to recover—or establish—
dignity as the possessors of legal rights, which, in turn, come with legal 
remedies.83 In recognizing victims and providing them legally ordered 
restitution, prosecutions also provide a venue for victims to heal.84
5. Deterrence
Accountability also promotes long-term peace by deterring future 
atrocities.85 Post-conflict trials remove and punish leaders who perpetrated 
gross violations, preventing such individuals from committing further 
violations. 86 Conversely, if persons, particularly leaders, are not held 
responsible, they may feel emboldened by their impunity and be more 
likely to interfere with the peace-building process or commit future 
crimes.87 The incorporation of justice mechanism “are a foundational and 
forward-looking affirmation that no group, including public officials and 
the armed forces, is above the law and that the new democracy will not 
tolerate such behavior.”88 The implementation of justice mechanisms can 
reinforce broader security and justice reforms to support the post-conflict 
state’s ability to strengthen rule of law and establish a framework for 
sustainable peace.89 In this way, the justice-first approach believes future 
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crimes can be deterred by demonstrating that such crimes will be punished, 
developing the institutions capable of punishing any future crimes, and 
establishing a strong framework for rule of law.
C. Achieving Justice-First in Practice
To implement a justice-first approach to peace, it is necessary to 
ensure that an accountability mechanism exercises jurisdiction over those 
who may be responsible for the commission of atrocities.  The mechanism 
may be an existing court or tribunal, or it could be one created for the 
particular conflict by the Security Council, created by the U.N. in 
agreement with the state and endorsed by the General Assembly, or by the 
parties to the peace process.90 The mechanism may also be active during 
the peace process, or it may come into force after the process, but with no 
retroactive jurisdiction.91
Peace processes are more likely to confer jurisdiction to an 
accountability mechanism when the peace process is inclusive of the 
interests of all key stakeholders, not just the armed combatants.  While the 
armed actors are less likely to seek the inclusion of an accountability 
mechanism, civil society, victims, marginalized populations, and other 
groups who were harmed during the conflict and did not, themselves,
commit atrocities are likely to seek justice.  A transparent peace process is 
more accessible to these stakeholders and makes it more likely that they 
will be able to assert their interests for insertion in the peace agreement.
Accountability mechanisms are most likely to be fair, balanced, and 
successful in states that emerge from conflict as democracies.  The peace 
process itself should model the democratic process and inclusive 
representation that is hoped to be achieved in the state.
There are a number of justice-based mechanisms that can be employed 
to further the justice-first approach.  These include referral to the ICC; the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal; the establishment of hybrid tribunals; the 
creation of domestic war crimes chambers, the application of universal 
jurisdiction, and the avoidance of amnesty. Notably, the parties can 
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activate some of these mechanisms, while others are activated by the 
international community.
1. The International Criminal Court
The ICC can prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.92 The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over atrocities if:  (1) 
the atrocities were committed by or on the territory of states that have 
subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, (2) the U.N. Security 
Council refers the matter to the court, or (3) the state refers the matter to the 
court.93 The court also has jurisdiction over nationals of state parties to the 
Rome Statute, regardless of where the individual’s acts took place.94
States that are parties to the Rome Statue may find the court exercising 
jurisdiction and indicting key players in the midst of the peace process or 
shortly thereafter.  The ICC has ongoing investigations and cases involving,
Burundi, Georgia, the Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, which were initiated by 
the ICC itself. 95 The ICC also unilaterally initiated preliminary 
examinations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, Ukraine, and in 
Iraq.96
During a peace process, the U.N. Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may determine that the conflict presents a 
threat to international peace and security and confer jurisdiction on the 
ICC.97 The Security Council made such referrals in the case of Sudan 
(Darfur)98 and Libya.99 In the case of Sudan, the court indicted Omar Al-
Bashir, the President of Sudan for genocide,100 and in the case of Libya the 
court indicted Muammar Gaddafi for crimes against humanity.101
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States may also refer matters to the ICC on their own initiative, as was 
the case with the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Mali.102 These states all referred the matter to 
the court while the conflict was still ongoing and arrest warrants, 
indictments, or convictions were issued against political and armed leaders 
during the peace process or directly after.103 For instance, in the DRC, 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo founded and led the rebel group, the Union of 
Congolese Patriots, and was a key actor in the Ituri Conflict.104 The ICC 
issued a warrant for Lubanga’s arrest while the peace process was 
underway, and Lubanga was arrested and indicted.105 The ICC also opened 
preliminary examinations in Gabon and Palestine at the request of the 
states.106 Such a referral may happen during a conflict, retroactively by a 
new government, or by including a commitment to refer in the terms of a 
peace agreement.107
2. Ad Hoc Tribunals
On a number of occasions the Security Council, or the General 
Assembly acting with a member state, created an ad hoc tribunal to cement 
a role for justice in the peace process or as part of the transition process.108
Such tribunals were created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.109 The
Yugoslavia Tribunal was formed and began its investigations and 
indictments while the peace process was ongoing, and the Rwanda Tribunal 
was established at the conclusion of the conflict.110
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3. Hybrid Tribunals
Hybrid tribunals are a mix of international and domestic actors and can 
be created by the international community, the parties themselves, or in 
collaboration. 111 The U.N. Security Council, at the request of the 
government of Sierra Leone, created the Special Court for Sierra Leone,112
and the General Assembly in cooperation with Cambodia created the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“Cambodia
Tribunal”).113 The Sierra Leone Tribunal conducted prosecutions based on 
both international and domestic law for crimes committed during the Sierra 
Leone Civil War, which began with a Liberian-led coup attempt.114 The 
tribunal tried and convicted a number of high-level officials, including 
Liberian President Charles Taylor.115 The Cambodia Tribunal was created
in 2001 to try cases based on international and domestic law for acts 
occurring under the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.116 To date, the 
tribunal has indicted five high-level Khmer Rouge officials, leading to three 
convictions117 and two suspensions of proceedings—one due to the death of 
the defendant118 and one due to the defendant’s poor health.119
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4. Domestic Tribunals
Domestic courts and tribunals may also be utilized to prosecute 
atrocities and can be written directly into the peace agreement. Pre-existing 
state courts can be used, especially if the state has strong legal institutions 
and the courts have jurisdiction over atrocities.  Alternatively, a new 
domestic tribunal specifically focused on prosecuting atrocities that 
occurred during the conflict can be created. In Uganda, the International 
Crimes Division (ICD), a special division in the High Court of Uganda, was 
established in accordance with the comprehensive peace agreement 
between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel 
group.120 The ICD’s prosecutorial efforts are complementary to the ICC’s
ongoing LRA prosecutions. 121 In Colombia, under the 2016 peace 
agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forced 
of Columbia (FARC), FARC members who provide false testimony, fail to 
make an honest confession, or refuse to confess at all to the truth 
commission can be prosecuted in the Colombia criminal justice system.122
5. Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction is the “assertion of jurisdiction over offences 
regardless of the place where they were committed and the nationality of 
the perpetrator or the victim.”123 The basis of universal jurisdiction is found 
in both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law.124 A
state may exercise universal jurisdiction by enacting state-level universal 
jurisdiction legislation and then proceeding with investigations and trials, or
by the state courts assert international law, rather than state law.125 One of 
the first instances of states exercising universal jurisdiction were the 
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prosecutions of former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet in courts in both 
Spain and England.126 Ultimately, both Spanish and British courts made 
their decisions grounded in universal jurisdiction as codified in their 
domestic laws,127 and these cases set off a firestorm, bringing universal 
jurisdiction front and center in efforts to hold violators accountable for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.128
                                                                       
126. See Patrick Wegner, No Limits for Justice? Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Former 
Chadian President Hissene Habré, JUST. CONFLICT (Dec. 18, 2011), https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/
12/18/no-limits-for-justice-universal-jurisdiction-and-the-case-of-former-chadian-president-hissenehabr
e/ (naming Pinochet’s case “the most famous” to be brought under universal jurisdiction); Universal 
Jurisdiction, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-nationalcourts/dome
stic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (including Pinochet’s case on its list of 
“Prominent Cases Involving Universal Jurisdiction”); see generally Inbal Sansani, The Pinochet 
Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissène Habré, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 32 (2001) (reviewing the 
application of universal jurisdiction in the case of Pinochet); Sofie A. E. Høgestøl, The Habré 
Judgement at the Extraordinary African Chambers:  A Singular Victory in the Fight Against Impunity,
34 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 147, 148–49 (2016) (discussing the seesaw between the Spanish and English 
courts on what legal standards to apply to Pinochet’s case).  For more on the efforts of the Spanish court 
to prosecute Augusto Pinochet, see generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and 
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2011).
127. See Sansani, supra note 126, at 33 (finding both the Spanish and English courts grounded 
their jurisdiction decisions in domestic law that codified universal jurisdiction over certain activities).  
In Spain, Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power grants Spanish courts jurisdiction over 
crimes that can be classified as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, or other crimes in 
contravention of international agreements.  MARGARITA LACABE, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
AGAINST CHILEAN AND ARGENTINEAN REPRESSORS IN SPAIN: A SHORT SUMMARY (1998), http://www.
derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html.  Under this law, the Spanish court claimed jurisdiction over 
Pinochet since the complaint alleged genocide, terrorism, and crimes against humanity.  Id. Similarly, 
England had ratified the Torture Convention and subsequently incorporated that international agreement 
into its domestic law allowing universal jurisdiction over cases of torture.  Tanaz Moghadam, Note, 
Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction:  Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissène 
Habré, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 480 (2008).  This being the case, U.K. courts had 
jurisdiction over Pinochet and could extradite him to Spain based on his conviction for torture.  Id. at 
481.
128. See Paul Chevigny, The Limitations of Universal Jurisdiction, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Mar. 
2006), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/97/32133.html (recognizing the 
Pinochet case as the start of the “high tide” of universal jurisdiction cases); see also Ex-Chad Dictator 
Indicted in Senegal, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 3, 2000, 7:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/0
2/03/ex-chad-dictator-indicted-senegal (viewing the Pinochet case as reaffirming the principles of 
universal jurisdiction wherein states can judge crimes against humanity no matter where the acts 
occurred and can extend this jurisdiction even to former heads of state).
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6. Barring Amnesty
Many scholars argue that amnesty for crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide is in and of itself a violation of international law.129
The U.N. has also established guidelines that prohibit its representatives 
from supporting amnesty provisions. 130 Indeed, the international 
community tends to hold that perpetrators of war crimes and human rights 
violations should be held accountable. 131 Moreover, some argue that 
customary international law also obligates states to bring perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice.132 Parties may be legally obligated to pursue 
justice mechanisms as a part of the peace process.
In some states, there is a combination of the above-mentioned 
accountability mechanisms.  For instance, in Bosnia, the ad hoc Yugoslavia 
Tribunal was initiated during the conflict and later, after the peace 
agreement, domestic prosecutions began as well.133 In Rwanda, the ad hoc
Rwandan Tribunal functioned simultaneously with domestic 
prosecutions.134 Additionally, in Rwanda, the gacaca courts, traditional 
justice system, provided community-level truth and reconciliation.135 In
Colombia, the ICC has begun preliminary investigations in parallel to the 
domestic prosecutorial process.136
                                                                       
129. Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 1.
130. William A. Schabas, National Amnesties, Truth Commissions and International Criminal 
Tribunals, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 373, 374 (Bartram S. Brown 
ed., 1st ed., 2011).  However, Article 6(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II both include references to the right of a person to be 
pardoned or receive amnesty.  Id. at 375.  One caveat is that the context in which both are written seems 
to refer to cases of capital punishment, not post-conflict situations.  Id.
131. See LIE ET AL., supra note 82, at 1.
132. Id.
133. What Is the Former Yugoslavia?, U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) 
[hereinafter ICTY].
134. Rwanda:  International Tribunal Closing Its Doors, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 23, 2015, 
2:50 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/rwanda-international-tribunal-closing-its-doors.
135. U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf.
136. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2014 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-
Exam-2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 REPORT].
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D. Case Studies
The justice-first perspective can be seen in the peace processes and 
peace agreements of many states.  The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia was established through U.N. Security Council 
resolution while the conflict in Bosnia was ongoing.137 During the ongoing 
peace process, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was granted the authority to begin 
indicting individuals perceived as responsible for atrocities. 138 The
President of the self-proclaimed Republka Srpska Radovan Karadžiü and 
his commanding general, Ratko Mladiü, were indicted for war crimes,
which prevented them from even attending the peace negotiations at 
Dayton.139 The indictments issued by the ICC provided the international 
community with moral clarity as to who was responsible for the conflict, 
and helped to provide a rationale for when the U.N. Security Council 
ordered a no fly zone and eventual air strikes against the Serbian forces to 
halt the genocide. In Dayton, Serbia was represented by Slobodan 
Miloševiü, and during the negotiations, the New York Times quoted a 
Yugoslavia Tribunal official saying “[w]e cannot deny that (Milosevic) is a 
suspect.”140 Miloševiü was indicted in 1999, four years after signing the 
Dayton Accords,141 he was arrested in 2001, and died in prison in 2006 
while his trial was ongoing.142
In post-genocide Rwanda, prosecution of perpetrators of the genocide 
was embraced as the means for the restoration of law and order in the 
state.143 Justice was a priority in reconciliation and transitioning after the 
violence.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by 
the U.N. Security Council, prosecuted high-level perpetrators of the 
genocide while domestic tribunals addressed lower-level perpetrators.144
                                                                       
137. ICTY, supra note 133.
138. Id.
139. RICHARD H. STEINBERG, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 218 (2016); see Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History:  Negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords,
ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, http://adst.org/2014/11/the-dayton-peace-accords/#.Wm3li 
JM-eRs (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
140. Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
141. Michael P. Scharf, The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., June 5, 
1999, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/4/issue/3/indictment-slobodan-milosevic.
142. Marlise Simons & Alison Smale, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader 
Accused of War Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/euro
pe/slobodan-milosevic-64-former-yugoslav-leader-accused-of-war.html.
143. IZABELA STEFLJA, CHALLENGES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA 1 (2012),
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/challenges-of-transitional-justice-in-rwanda/.
144. Id. at 1–2.
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Additionally, the gacaca courts, a traditional justice system, provided truth 
and reconciliation at the community-level.145
In some instances, the ICC has also begun prosecution efforts through 
its own initiative or at the request of states while parties are negotiating or 
after parties have reached agreement, thus prioritizing justice through its 
own volition.146 In 2004, the Ugandan government referred its conflict with 
the LRA to the ICC.147 In 2005, in Uganda, the ICC issued arrest warrants 
for high-level members of the LRA, including its leader Joseph Kony,
while negotiations between the LRA and the government were ongoing.148
All suspects remain at large, except Dominic Ongwen, who surrendered 
himself in 2015.149 A draft comprehensive peace agreement in 2008, which 
was ultimately not signed by Kony, also prioritized justice, providing for a
special chamber in the Ugandan courts to prosecute LRA leaders.150 Based 
on the draft peace agreement language, the International Crimes Division is 
a special Division of High Court of Uganda and is designed to operate in 
parallel to the ICC.151
In Sudan the ICC also issued arrest warrants to begin prosecution 
efforts for atrocities that took place in Darfur while the peace process was 
underway.152 The arrest warrants included a warrant for the President of 
Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.153 The Sudanese government strongly protested the 
ICC’s actions and has refused to cooperate with investigations or the arrest 
warrants. 154 Regional institutions, including the African Union, voiced 
support of the Sudanese government’s protests.155
                                                                       
145. Id.
146. 2014 REPORT, supra note 136, at 2.
147. Situation in Uganda:  ICC-02/04, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda.
148. Id.
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150. Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 2.
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IV. PEACE WITH JUSTICE
“We have learned that the rule of law delayed is lasting peace denied, and that 
justice is a handmaiden of true peace.”156
Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations
The purpose of this section is to identify the core components of a 
third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle: peace with justice.  The 
peace-first approach highlights the obstacles to peace (and the resolution of 
conflict) posed by the pursuit of justice.  The justice-first approach on the 
other hand, underscores the impossibility of sustainable peace absent 
genuine accountability.  The “peace with justice” approach, meanwhile, 
advances the notion that peace and justice are not quite so mutually 
exclusive as the former two approaches would indicate—rather, in certain 
circumstances parties to a negotiation can artfully weave the two 
together.157 There are a variety of techniques by which to accomplish 
this. 158 This section will provide a brief overview of the “peace with 
justice” approach, followed by a discussion of the primary mechanisms or 
techniques for pursuing both peace and justice.  The complicated interplay 
of these various mechanisms is illustrated by the diverse attempts to build a 
“peace with justice” framework in Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte
d’Ivoire, and Cambodia.159
There is an emerging third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle.  
This approach claims that parties to a conflict can mutually pursue peace
                                                                       
156. Statement, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting of the Security 
Council on Justice and the Rule of Law:  The United Nations Role, U.N. Statement S/PV4833 (Sept. 24, 
2003).
157. Bartáomiej Krzan, International Criminal Court Facing the Peace vs. Justice Dilemma, 2
INT’L COMP. JURIS. 81, 81 (2016); see generally Alex Whiting, An Investigation Mechanism for Syria:  
The General Assembly Steps into the Breach, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 231 (2017); Gabriella Blum, The 
Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57 (2013); WILLIAM SCHABAS, KEIN FRIEDEN 
OHNE GERECHTIGKEIT?: DIE ROLLE DER INTERNATIONALEN STRAFJUSTIZ [NO PEACE WITHOUT 
JUSTICE? THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW] (Edith Nerke & Jürgen Bauer trans., 2013)
[hereinafter NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE]; Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace Versus 
Justice and the International Criminal Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12 (2008); Beth Van Schaack, 
International & US Support for Transitional Justice Initiatives, JUST SECURITY (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/31737/international-support-transitional-justice-initiatives/.
158. See, e.g., Renée Jeffery, Sequencing Transitional Justice Mechanisms:  Lessons from the 
Solomon Islands, MIDDLE E. INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.mei.edu/content/sequencingtransitional-
justice-mechanisms-lessons-solomon-islands; Paul Gready & Simon Robins, From Transitional to 
Transformative Justice:  A New Agenda for Practice, 8 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 339, 344 (2014).
159. See generally Whiting, supra note 157; Blum, supra note 157; Keller, supra note 157; 
Van Schaak, supra note 157.
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and justice.160 This approach rejects the perceived tensions between peace 
and justice as a “false dichotomy.” 161 Under this approach, peace and 
justice are mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive.162 The 
question, then, becomes not which goal to pursue, but rather when and 
how.163 Although this third approach introduces an intriguing concept, 
there are ultimately important limitations to this approach as well.164
The primary tenets of the “peace with justice” approach can be 
summarized as:
1) peace and justice are inextricably connected to both reinforce 
and complement one another;
2) the promotion of both, regardless of how complex and 
difficult, should be pursued;
3) there is a grave need for peace, but it should be found in 
conjunction with recognition of the demand for justice; and
4) when mishandled, peace and justice may clash, but peace 
should never justify impunity.165
Supporters of this approach argue that law is a cornerstone to any 
peace-building mission, and thus, pursuing peace with justice seems a 
logical step in transitioning a state from conflict to sustainable peace.166 By 
integrating peace with justice during a post-conflict transitional period, 
peace-builders can provide oversight both to the laying down of arms and
efforts at capacity-building to administer justice.167 Additionally, when 
peace is combined with justice, the perception of justice may shift from the 
retributive to the restorative, such that states and citizens more effectively 
seek reconciliation.  Under this view, a framework for long-term peace that 
contemplates more than an immediate end to a conflict relies on justice to 
be both sustainable and enduring.168 In support of this argument, states can 
                                                                       
160. See Krzan, supra note 157, at 81.
161. Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice:  The International Criminal Court and 
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 211 (2008) [hereinafter Achieving 
Peace with Justice].
162. Langer et al., supra note 19, at 183.
163. Id.
164. See generally DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN 
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165. See Krzan, supra note 157, at 87.
166. See OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM.RTS., RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES:
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take a variety of steps to intertwine peace and justice.  These actions 
include a “sequencing” approach and a “holistic” approach. 169
Additionally, states often incorporate a range of justice-oriented 
mechanisms that sometimes expand beyond the notion of direct 
accountability.  Further mechanisms for interlacing peace with justice 
include:
1) non-state justice mechanisms; 
2) reparations; and 
3) truth-seeking.170
A. Methods to Meet the Needs of the State Post-Conflict
States could use any of these methods, with consideration to which 
method most meets the needs of the post-conflict state in question. 
1. Sequencing
As the term suggests, the approach of “sequencing” involves the 
strategic phasing of various transitional justice mechanisms.171 Rather than 
asking if peace or justice should be pursued, the question then becomes 
when and how states should pursue both objectives.172 With sequencing, 
there is no need to compromise justice for peace as justice will be pursued 
after parties reach a peace agreement. 173 This perspective accepts that 
justice may be a necessarily long-term goal, but also recognizes the 
importance of justice and underscores that accountability will eventually 
manifest. 174 However, opponents of this process argue that under this 
approach justice will not occur quickly enough to satisfy citizens and 
victims, because it takes time to gain the capacity, legitimacy, and
independence to review claims or overturn amnesties.175
                                                                       
169. Jeffery, supra note 158; Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.
170. LUC HUYSE & MARK SALTER, TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER 
VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 3 (2008); see generally Reparations,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
171. Jeffery, supra note 158.
172. Krzan, supra note 157, at 82.
173. See Prorok, supra note 26, at 213.
174. Jeffery, supra note 158.
175. Daniel Serwer, Justice and Peace:  A False Dichotomy, SYRIA JUST. & ACCT. CTR. (July 
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2. Holistic
Additionally, states can accomplish peace and justice through holistic 
measures. 176 These measures involve non-prosecutorial accountability 
measures that contribute actively to peace while simultaneously supporting 
justice.177 Potential mechanisms under this holistic understanding include 
truth and reconciliation commissions, local or traditional justice, public 
acknowledgment mechanisms, and/or institutional reform.178 Alternative 
methods of justice may be more successful than prosecutorial means of 
justice.179 This framework broadens the approach to transitional justice 
beyond merely institutional responses, so as to incorporate broader political 
and social involvement.180 Further, these non-prosecutorial mechanisms 
have similar justice goals to traditional prosecutions:
1) discovering, clarifying, and acknowledging past abuses;
2) responding to victims’ needs;
3) contributing to justice and accountability;
4) outlining institutional responsibility and recommending 
reforms; and 
5) promoting reconciliation and reducing conflict.181
3. Non-State Justice Mechanisms
Non-state justice mechanisms, sometimes referred to as traditional 
justice, incorporate indigenous and customary practices into the transitional 
justice process.182 For instance, gacaca courts, local community courts 
inspired by the Rwandan traditional courts, emerged as a traditional 
mechanism to assist Rwanda’s national courts with trials of the 130,000 
people imprisoned following the Rwandan genocide. 183 The U.N. 
Secretary-General emphasized the vital role of “indigenous and informal 
traditions for administering justice or settling disputes,” while conforming 
                                                                       
176. Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Achieving Peace with Justice, supra note 161, at 209, 212–13, 227.
180. Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.
181. Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice?  Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3
MELB. J. INT’L L. 247, 261 (2002).
182. HUYSE & SALTER, supra note 170.
183. Id. at 37.
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with international law to ensure the inclusion of all groups in the justice 
process.184
4. Reparations
Granting reparations, meanwhile, is an internationally recognized 
method of restoring victims of serious crimes to their financial, physical, or 
psychological position before suffering the harm in question.185 Victims’ 
reparations can take multiple forms, including restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.186 Whatever 
the form of reparations, the purpose of the mechanism is to provide a 
meaningful response to the harm suffered, that can be tailored to the 
specific context, needs, and priorities of the victim in question—and in 
doing so, this mechanism can theoretically meet at least some of the 
underlying purposes of accountability.
5. Truth-Seeking
Truth-seeking is the process of investigating past human rights 
violations to determine what happened, why it happened, and to what effect 
in order to prevent future abuses.187 Mechanisms for truth-seeking include 
truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, and fact-finding missions.188
Truth commissions are either non-judicial or quasi-judicial bodies that 
investigate past abuses to establish the truth of the violations and to publish 
a final report that can make policy recommendations, disseminate victims’ 
voices, and serve as a historical record.189 There have been over forty truth 
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United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice:  Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, 8 (Mar. 
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commissions over the last three decades,190 highlighting the popularity (and 
potentially the utility) of these mechanisms.  Depending on the objective 
pursued, truth commissions allow for both the victims to tell their story and 
the perpetrators to admit the crimes they committed in order to promote 
forgiveness and reconciliation. 191 Similar to truth commissions, 
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions investigate past human 
rights abuses to discover the truth but follow narrower mandates192 that 
focus on a particular event, category of crime, or time period.193
B. Peace with Justice in Colombia
The peace process in Colombia reflects one manifestation of the peace 
with justice approach.  In particular, elements of both peace and justice 
approaches were integrated into the agreement that was ultimately adopted 
in Colombia in December 2016. 194 This agreement, between the 
Colombian government and the FARC, included the establishment of a 
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U.S. INST. PEACE (Jan. 1, 1995), https://www.usip.org/publications/1995/01/commissions-inquiry-sri-
lanka.
194. Nicholas Casey, Colombia Signs Peace Agreement with FARC After 5 Decades of War,
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justice mechanism that offers amnesty.195 The provisions of the agreement 
emphasize the importance of “consolidating peace and realizing the rights 
of victims,” the “promot[ion of] a stable and lasting peace,” and the 
Colombian state’s responsibility to “investigate, clarify, prosecute and 
sanction serious violations of IHRL [international human rights law] and 
IHL [international humanitarian law].” 196 These provisions reflect the 
blend of peace and justice that the agreement strives to accomplish.
In particular, the peace deal included provisions to establish a 
Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of 
Non-Repetition (Comprehensive System) to carry out a comprehensive 
transitional justice plan, based on a 2015 “Special Peace Jurisdiction” 
agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC.197 The 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace was designed to include both a Peace 
Tribunal and Judicial Panels to address cases of “serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law” committed by FARC members.198
Although the justice mechanism has prosecutorial functions, the
agreement provides categorically that any perpetrators, who confess to 
atrocities, will be exempt from prison, jail, or any “equivalent” form of 
detention.199 Instead, those who confess will be given “‘sanctions’ that 
have a ‘restorative and reparative function’ . . . [.]”200 These sanctions 
entail “projects” that will be designed to aid victims of the conflict.201
FARC members, who were not primarily responsible for the commission of 
the most serious crimes and who wholly confessed their acts, will receive 
either amnesty or alternative penalties such as community service and acts 
of reparation.202
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If, however, FARC members refuse to confess, provide false 
testimony, or fail to make an honest confession in a timely manner, they 
will be prosecuted in the Colombian criminal justice system—although they 
may achieve a reduced sentence by making a partial confession.203 Those 
who take responsibility but do not do so in a timely manner may face a five 
to eight year prison sentence.204 Those who do not confess at all and are 
found guilty will serve a fifteen-to-twenty year prison sentence. 205
Conversely, an individual who committed gross human rights violations—
such as gender-based war crimes and crimes against humanity—will not be 
eligible to receive amnesty and will face criminal prosecution.206 Even 
then, those who immediately confess their crimes may receive a less severe
punishment, such as a non-prison detention restriction on their liberty.207
The contours of the 2016 peace agreement draw on earlier Colombian 
practice.208 In many ways, the 2016 agreement followed the accountability 
framework that had been previously utilized to demobilize various anti-
FARC paramilitary groups, in particular the Justice and Peace Law in 
2005. 209 To support demobilization, the Law allowed individuals that 
participated voluntarily to take part in a truth-telling process via a special 
prosecution tribunal.210 If fighters participated in this truth-telling process, 
they were eligible for reduced sentences or even amnesties.211 In practice, 
these mechanisms provided around ninety percent of the paramilitary 
members with what is essentially de facto amnesty.212
The peace agreement introduced in 2016 attempted to draw from this 
past Colombian experience, so as to strike a fine balance between peace and 
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justice.213 Indeed, Colombian President Santos, one of the architects of the 
peace agreement, highlighted in reference to the agreement that “perfect 
justice would not allow peace.”214 Instead, President Santos argued that the 
deal “achieves as much justice as possible while transitioning from conflict 
to peace.”215 Ultimately, the system proposed was closer to an amnesty 
based truth and reconciliation commission, than a true direct accountability 
system.216
In October 2016, the (already signed) peace agreement was put to a 
popular referendum.217 To the surprise of many, 50.24% of the population 
voted to reject the peace agreement, and the referendum failed.218 The 
primary concerns of those who voted to reject the peace agreement 
centered, in large part, on the balance of justice interlaced into the 
agreement.219 For instance, one major concern was the legal immunity for 
rank-and-file soldiers of the FARC,220 who were allegedly responsible for 
crimes including murder, kidnapping, and rape against civilians.221 Another 
concern was the lack of defining details for the tribunal in which FARC 
leaders were to be tried, combined with the opportunity for FARC leaders 
to receive reduced sentences or potentially even amnesty in return for early 
confessions.222
An additional barrier to adopting the agreement was the agreement’s 
commitment to provide FARC fighters with a monthly stipend for two
years, and the provision of $2500 payments to individual ex-combatants to 
start a business.223 The ability of the FARC to restructure into a political 
party under the peace deal was also a divisive issue.224 Moreover, the 
agreement permits FARC members not serving prison sentences to run for 
                                                                       
213. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.3.1.
214. Vivanco, supra note 202.
215. Id.
216. Rahul Srivastava, The Colombian Peace Referendum, ST ANDREWS FOREIGN AFF. REV.
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2016/10/the-colombian-peace-referendum/.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Srivastava, supra note 216.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Colombia Referendum:  Voters Reject FARC Peace Deal, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:2452
office, and grants the FARC ten congressional seats for two terms.225 In 
other words, there was a poignant concern—held by various international 
human rights organizations in addition to the Colombian population—that 
those most responsible for the commission of atrocity crimes would not be 
held sufficiently accountable for their participation in the conflict.226
Following the rejection of the peace agreement in the October 2016 
referendum, the draft agreement was submitted to the Colombian Congress 
for revisions.227 Colombia’s Congress approved a revised version of the 
agreement,228 and the public did not vote on the revised document.229 The 
Agreement included over fifty changes to the version introduced in the 
referendum.230 The new provisions of the agreement clarified the process 
for prosecuting FARC members responsible before the special court.231
However, the new agreement did not provide for prison sentences for those 
who confessed to war crimes.232 The reasoning for this was that doing so 
would cause the FARC to walk away from the peace agreement.233 The 
new agreement also included a provision requiring the FARC to relinquish 
assets, some of which were acquired through drug trafficking, to contribute 
to a fund for compensating victims. 234 The agreement also did not 
introduce limitations to the FARC’s ability to engage as a political party.235
                                                                       
225. Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Tribunals for ex FARC Rebels, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 
2017, 6:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/colombias-congress-approvespea
ce-tribunals-for-ex-farc-rebels-idUSKBN1DS1C6.
226. Vivanco, supra note 202.
227. Stephen Gill, Colombia’s Congress to Vote on Peace Deal Next Week, COLOM. REP. (Nov. 
24, 2016), https://colombiareports.com/colombias-congress-vote-peace-deal-next-week/.
228. Nicholas Casey, Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Accord with FARC, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/colombia-farc-accord-juanmanu
el-santos.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Casey, Colombia’s Congress].
229. Id.
230. Associated Press, Colombia’s Government Formally Ratifies Revised Farc Peace Deal,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:27), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/01/colombiasgovern
ment-formally-ratifies-revised-farc-peace-deal [hereinafter Associated Press, Colombia].
231. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2; Casey, Colombia’s Congress, supra note 
228.
232. Casey, Colombia’s Congress, supra note 228.
233. Id.
234. Associated Press, Colombia, supra note 230.
235. Id.
2018] Williams, Dicker & Paterson 453
Ultimately, in December 2016 the revised peace agreement went into 
effect,236 and preparations for its implementation began.  In assessing the 
justice framework introduced as a result, it is also worth noting that 
Colombia has also ratified the ICC, and therefore, the domestic mechanisms
under the agreement will operate while ICC investigations and preliminary 
examinations in Colombia continue to function in parallel.237 The ICC 
opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Colombia in June 
2004, on alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes. 238 This 
preliminary examination is ongoing as of 2018, and most recently has 
included field visits by the ICC to clarify various aspects of the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace.239
C. Peace with Justice in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone presents another instance of peace interwoven with 
justice, although distinct from the Colombian context.  In particular, the 
Sierra Leone experience illustrates the practice of providing broad amnesty 
via a peace agreement, combined with targeted, high-level prosecutions.
The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement contained an amnesty provision that 
prevented prosecutions for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.240
In 2000, a hybrid Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established 
with the broad purpose of truth-telling and establishing a historical record 
of atrocities.241 In 2002, however, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (a 
hybrid tribunal) was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315, 
with the purpose of prosecuting crimes under both international law and 
Sierra Leone’s domestic law.242
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Controversy arose in relation to the interpretation of the amnesty 
provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, in light of the prosecutorial 
framework of the Special Court.  In theory, the amnesty provisions of the 
peace agreement would have prevented the Special Court from pursuing 
charges for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.243 However, the 
Special Court itself interpreted the amnesty provision as inapplicable to the 
prosecution of international crimes.244 This interpretation found support in 
the U.N.’s approach as the guarantor of the Lomé Agreement; in clarifying 
the peace agreement, the U.N. stated that the amnesty and pardon article 
was inapplicable to international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 245 On this basis, the Special Court proceeded with 
prosecutorial action for a select pool of high-level perpetrators, culminating 
its work with the conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.246
D. Peace with Justice in the Côte d’Ivoire
Following the atrocities suffered by civilians in the Côte d’Ivoire’s 
2010–2011 post-election crisis, 247 newly-elected President Ouattara
established a Special Investigation and Examination Cell, composed of 
judges and prosecutors, to take steps against those most responsible for 
atrocity crimes.248 In 2015, the Special Cell charged more than twenty
individuals, including high-level commanders from both sides. 249 A
national truth commission, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation 
Commission (CDVR), was also established in 2011 to investigate 
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violations.250 By the time the CDVR’s mandate concluded in 2014, the 
entity took statements from more than 72,000 Ivorian nationals.251 The 
final report was provided to President Ouattara, who did not make the 
report publicly-available but did commit approximately $16.2 million to 
indemnify victims on its basis. 252 A new commission, the National 
Commission for Reconciliation and Indemnification of Victims, was 
established in March 2015 to oversee a reparations program for victims of 
an even wider range of abuses, committed between 1990 and 2012.253 This 
package provided a blend of peace-prioritizing mechanisms with measures 
for justice that expanded beyond traditional direct accountability.
Additional aspects of direct accountability also filtered into the Côte 
d’Ivoire context.  For instance, in January 2016 the ICC initiated a joint 
trial of former president Laurent Gbabgo and Charles Ble Goude for crimes 
against humanity committed in the course of the post-election crisis.254 The 
ICC also sought Simone Gbagbo, the former first lady who remained in 
Ivoirian custody where she was tried and convicted for “crimes against the 
state.” 255 When the ICC claimed that she should be prosecuted for atrocity 
crimes in The Hague, the Côte d’Ivoire charged her with crimes against 
humanity and retained jurisdiction as a form of “positive 
complementarity”256 although she was ultimately acquitted of the specific 
crimes against humanity charges. 257 Meanwhile, former President 
Gbagbo’s trial started in 2016, and he remains in ICC custody as 
prosecutions continue.258 In 2015 Ouattara was peacefully re-elected.259
Although not all issues are settled (for example, protests broke out in 2016 
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in relation to various constitutional reforms) violence has largely settled and 
economic growth is on the horizon.260
E. Peace with Justice in Cambodia
Lastly, the Cambodian context provides an instance of peace with 
justice, via sequencing.  After a decade-long armed conflict between 
Cambodia and Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1991.261
The Paris Peace Accords formalized an arrangement that maintained the 
Cambodian Khmer Rouge in political power despite its responsibility for 
significant atrocities in Cambodian territory.262 In doing so, and in its more 
general avoidance of addressing the issue of atrocity crimes, the Paris Peace 
Accords effectively provided the Khmer Rouge with impunity.263 In effect, 
the Cambodian peace process prioritized peace and stability, over
accountability.
Justice, however, was eventually introduced into the Cambodian 
context in a later period, following the securement of peace.  More than 
fifteen years after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, efforts for direct 
accountability culminated in the establishment of the Cambodian Tribunal
(a hybrid tribunal) in 2006.264 The court was established by agreement 
between the U.N. and the government of Cambodia.265 The purpose of the 
court was to prosecute those most responsible for violations of international 
law and other grave crimes. 266 Although an imperfect prosecutorial 
mechanism, to date the court has convicted three perpetrators.267
The experiences of Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Cambodia display the diverse methods by which to pursue a “peace with 
justice framework.”  These case studies illustrate, to various degrees, the 
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potential utility of developing transitional mechanisms for justice, 
providing general amnesties combined with targeted prosecutions, or 
sequencing justice mechanisms following the establishment of peace and 
stability.  Although not without its limitations, this approach demonstrates 
that in certain circumstances parties to a negotiation can choose to 
interweave peace with justice, rather than pursuing one at the total expense 
of the other.
V. THE SYRIAN CRISIS
The purpose of this section is to explore the interplay between the 
approaches of peace-first and justice-first in the context of the Syrian 
conflict.  The Syrian conflict is characterized by initial uncertainty as to 
whether the peace-first approach or the justice-first approach would take 
predominance in the peace process.  After a pivotal failed effort at the U.N.
Security Council to instill significant justice measures into the Syrian 
context, the Syrian process evolved towards a peace-first approach by those 
seeking to end, or at least manage, the conflict.  However, despite the 
traction that the peace-first approach has gained in the Syrian context, there 
are persistent efforts by key actors to weave accountability into the peace 
process.  While these efforts have had a relatively minor impact on the 
process, and it is clear the approach to resolve the Syrian crisis will not be 
one of justice-first, it remains to be seen whether the final stretch of the 
peace process is driven by a peace-first approach, or whether a peace with
justice approach is able to emerge. The seedling efforts towards 
accountability that are being instilled into the process now, may ultimately 
lay the foundation for moving towards a more focused accountability in the 
future.
In order to explore the interplay between the approaches of peace-first
and justice-first in the context of the Syrian conflict, this section will briefly 
review the origins of the conflict, its “spill-in” and multi-dimensional 
nature, and the U.N. peace process established to resolve the conflict.  The 
section will then trace the efforts of various key stakeholders to weave 
justice into the peace process through several mechanisms such as U.N.
Security Council referral to the ICC, the establishment of a Commission of 
Inquiry and an International, Impartial, Independent Mechanism, the 
creation of a number of documentation efforts, a proposal for a Hybrid 
Tribunal, and the use of universal jurisdiction.
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A. Origins of the Conflict
The Syrian conflict began with a small group of children writing anti-
government graffiti in Dara.268 They were arrested and tortured, sparking 
nationwide protests, and leading to a multi-dimensional civil war now in its 
eighth year.269 These nationwide protests against the Assad regime swept 
across the country beginning March 2011, 270 coinciding with the Arab 
Spring movement that swept through Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.271
The Assad regime responded with force and opposition groups began to 
organize, and arm themselves, leading to the formation of the Free Syrian 
Army.  The Free Syrian Army began to use force in defending against 
attacks by the Assad regime, and by mid-2011, what began as peaceful 
protests had transformed into a full-fledged internal conflict.272 Fighting 
has been near-constant since 2011.273 The conflict has also since expanded 
to include a vast number of differing Syrian opposition fighting brigades, as 
well as foreign terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS.274
Since its inception, the Syrian conflict has been marked by widespread 
and brutal atrocities.  The conflict has been characterized by a death toll 
exceeding 470,000 along with more than 11 million displaced, 275 the 
documented torture to death of more than 14,000, 276 the use of 
internationally prohibited chemical weapons, inherently indiscriminate 
barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and the indiscriminate use of incendiary 
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weapons in civilian-populated areas.277 While many of the actors involved 
in the conflict are responsible for atrocities, the vast majority have been 
(and continue to be) committed by the Assad regime.
B. Syria—A Multi-Dimensional Spill-In Conflict
In the Syrian conflict there are least six main groups of domestic 
forces, along with their international allies, engaged in at least five distinct
conflicts.278 While most wars run the risk of spilling-over into neighboring 
states, in the case of Syria the war has spilled into the country, with nearly a 
dozen external actors directly supporting parties to the conflict and in a 
number of instances deploying their own forces inside Syrian territory.279
The Syrian parties engaged in the conflict include:280
1. Government of the Syrian Arab Republic:  The current Syrian 
government, which has been under the executive rule of Bashar 
al-Assad since July 2000.281
2. Free Syrian Army (FSA):  Formed in August of 2011 by 
defectors from the Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army is one of 
the predominant Syrian armed opposition groups, comprised of 
more than fifty fighting factions.282
3. Kurdish Forces:  The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a 
Kurdish force that has been active in the Syrian conflict.283 The 
YPG is considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish 
government, and has been linked to the long-term insurgency war 
in Turkey.
4. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF):  A primarily Kurdish 
force that also includes local Arab militias, the SDF is comprised 
in large part by YPG fighters.284 The SDF are forces particularly 
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active in northern Syria and benefit from U.S. support in anti-
ISIS operations.285
5. Al Qaeda:  Al Qaeda in Syria is comprised largely of non-
Syrians, with only limited Syrian membership, and over the 
course of the conflict has transformed into a range of Al Qaeda 
“linked” organizations, most famously known as “Jabhat al-
Nusra.”286 Most recently, this entity has been renamed “Hayat 
Tahrir al-Sham,” or HTS.287
6. ISIS:  Infamously active in Syria, ISIS in this context is 
comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian fighters.288
Third party states and paramilitary organizations engaged in the 
conflict include:289
1. Russia:  Russia established an air base inside of Syria at the 
invitation of the Assad regime in 2015 and deployed bomber and 
fighter aircraft as well as special forces. 290 Russia regularly
attacks the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and 
occasionally ISIS.291
2. Iran: Iran deployed military forces and a significant number 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) al-Quds 
Force.292 Iranian forces on the ground in Syria may outnumber 
the military forces of the Syrian regime.293 Iranian forces fight 
on behalf of the Assad regime and engage primarily in operations 
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against the Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army, 
and the Syrian Democratic Forces.294
3. Hezbollah:  Hezbollah is quite active in the Syrian conflict, 
and as of 2016 an estimated 7000 Hezbollah fighters were based 
in Syria. 295 Hezbollah largely fights in support of the Assad 
regime, and as such engages primarily in operations against the 
Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army.296
4. Turkey:  Turkey deployed several thousand forces into 
Syria, 297 both to protect civilians from attack by the Syrian 
regime and to prevent Kurdish forces from holding contiguous 
territory along the Turkish border.  Turkey also deploys monitors 
for the de-escalation zones.298 In 2017, Turkey largely succeeded 
in securing a swathe of territory in northern Syria known as the 
“Euphrates Shield” area.299 Early in the conflict Turkey downed 
a Russian MiG fighter, which had crossed into its airspace,300 but 
more recently acts in close cooperation with Russia.
5. The United States:  The United States provides assistance, 
including weapons, to both the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian 
Democratic Forces.301 The United States has also conducted air 
strikes against Al-Qaeda and ISIS as part of a US-led coalition 
focused on the elimination of ISIS.302 Further, the United States 
has deployed approximately 2000 special forces and an artillery 
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unit inside Syria.303 The majority of the United States military 
efforts in the Syrian context are aimed towards the elimination of 
ISIS.304 Notably, in April of 2017, the United States launched a 
substantial cruise missile attack against air assets of the Assad 
regime, in retaliation for the regime’s chemical weapons attack 
on Khan Sheikhoun.305 In April of 2018, the United States, this 
time joined by the United Kingom and France, responded to the 
regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma with additional 
targeted strikes against regime military and research assets.
6. United Kingdom, France, and other EU states:  These states 
provide assistance to the Free Syrian Army and have conducted 
air strikes and deployed special forces against Al-Qaeda and 
ISIS, particularly as part of the US-led coalition.306
7. Saudi Arabia:  Saudi Arabia provides funding and weapons to 
the Free Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda. 307 As a 
significant supporter of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia is 
particularly focused on anti-Assad engagement.308
8. Qatar: Qatar provides funding and weapons to the Free 
Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda.  The majority of 
Qatar’s engagement in the Syrian context is particularly focused 
on anti-Assad engagement, but not necessarily in cooperation 
with Saudi Arabia.309
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9. Jordan:  Jordan provides support to the Free Syrian Army. 
Jordan is also an active participant in overseeing de-escalation 
zones in Syrian territory, particularly those in the south.310
10. International Al Qaeda: International Al-Qaeda in Syria has 
been active in the conflict since 2012.  At the outset of its 
participation, Al-Qaeda openly claimed the goal of removing 
Assad and creating an Islamic state.  Al-Qaeda has continued to 
present itself as anti-Assad force throughout the duration of the 
conflict.311
11. International ISIS: An offshoot of what was once Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq, International ISIS in Syria became particularly prevalent 
beginning in 2013, capturing significant portions of Syrian 
territory and eventually claiming of Raqqa as its de facto
capital.312 At the peak of its power, approximately ten million 
people lived under ISIS control. 313 ISIS engaged in offenses 
against Syrian opposition armed groups, the Assad regime, SDF 
forces, members of the US-led coalition, and others.  As of late 
2017 the US-led coalition seeking to eliminate ISIS claimed that 
nearly ninety-eight percent of ISIS-held territory has been 
liberated.314
The U.N. launched peace negotiations soon after the beginning of the 
conflict.315 The peace negotiations have proceeded through a variety of 
iterations and have produced a certain measure of momentum and 
accomplishments.316
The initial peace negotiations were headed by former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and yielded what has become known as the Geneva 
Communiqué. 317 The Communiqué, endorsed by the U.N. Security 
Council, provided for a new constitution, free and fair elections, the 
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establishment of a transitional governing body on the basis of mutual 
consent, and other components that have collectively come to form the core 
of the negotiating topics in the Geneva peace negotiations.318 The second 
phase of the peace negotiations was headed by Lakhdar Brahimi319 and
produced some limited momentum for a Transitional Governing Body 
designed to create an interim arrangement to transition President Assad 
from power and set the framework for a new constitution and elections.320
The talks stalled when the Assad regime refused to engage in substantive 
negotiations on a political solution.321
Renewed momentum for the peace negotiations culminated in the 
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 in December 2015, 
ushering in the third phase of the peace process.322 Staffan de Mistura 
headed the third phase and while producing little in the way of specific 
accomplishments has continued to provide a venue for the parties in the 
event a desire for serious negotiations emerges.323 The third phase has also 
expanded to include a parallel process in Astana, Kazakhstan managed by a 
Russian, Iranian and Turkish Troika focused on de-escalation zones 
(ceasefires for certain defined areas within the Syrian territory).324 Through 
this process a series of de-escalation zones have been established.325 The 
de-escalation zones have been somewhat successful in limiting the 
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violence, although violations by the regime and its allies continue.326 At 
various times during these three phases the U.N. Security Council has 
adopted resolutions supporting the peace negotiations and ratifying various 
minor outcomes.327
Whatever momentum the Astana and Geneva processes may have 
introduced for a political settlement, it is important to bear in mind that 
Assad’s position has been strengthened by the facts on the ground.328 In 
particular, with the support of Russia and Iran, the Assad regime has made 
sweeping gains in retaking territory from ISIS and the Syrian Opposition.329
Absent a fundamental change in the military landscape, the Assad regime is 
likely to maintain a significant military advantage on the ground.  Given 
this entrenchment, the likelihood of direct accountability for Assad or any 
other high-level perpetrators is diminished, at least for the immediate 
future.
C. Seeking to Weave Justice into the Syria Peace Process
As noted above, the Syrian peace process began with uncertainty 
towards how to resolve the peace versus justice puzzle—would a peace-first 
approach take hold, or would efforts towards instilling justice take 
primacy?  International actors took the debate to the U.N. Security Council, 
testing the waters of the peace versus justice puzzle with resolutions aimed 
at creating critical accountability measures.  However, these efforts were 
quickly chilled by Russian and Chinese vetoes.  In the wake of these vetoes, 
the Syrian conflict has become characterized by heavy reliance on the 
peace-first approach.  However, there are persistent and ongoing efforts to 
introduce at least a measure of justice into the peace process, and the 
balance towards a peace with justice approach may yet tip in the future.
To track the efforts to weave justice into the peace process this section 
will discuss the positions of the parties and mediators toward justice in the 
Geneva peace negotiations; the actions of the Security Council and the 
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General Assembly, the initiatives of civil society and non-state actors, and 
the use of universal jurisdiction by some European states.
1. Peace Negotiations
The parties and mediators to the Syrian peace negotiations have a 
mixed record of attempts to introduce accountability measures into the 
negotiations.  The Syrian Opposition has incorporated a measure of justice 
into their proposals, whereas the regime has not meaningfully addressed 
accountability.330 The U.N., meanwhile, has been lukewarm at best on the 
issue of accountability.331 In defense of justice, so to speak, the Syrian 
Opposition has staunchly refused any negotiation proposals that would 
permit the Assad regime to remain in power and thereby avoid 
accountability.  The Syrian Opposition also has refused to countenance any 
proposals that would result in Assad or members of his regime securing de 
facto or de jure impunity.332
On the proactive side, the Opposition has been clear that any peace 
agreement should result in a tangible mechanism for accountability.  The 
Opposition has produced a range of public material proposing various broad 
frameworks for accountability that could be incorporated into a peace 
agreement.333 For instance, in its September 2016 Vision Statement, the 
Syrian Opposition calls for a specific transitional justice committee 
composed of diverse and competent judges and lawyers, with the aim of 
balancing “between reconciliation efforts, on the one hand, and 
accountability, on the other.” 334 The committee is charged to fulfill 
international transitional justice standards, and develop mechanisms “to 
ensure accountability, reparation for the victims [ . . . ] achieve institutional 
reform, propose mechanisms to investigate violations and crimes, and keep 
records related to human rights violations.”335
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Notably, the Syrian Opposition has not made any calls for the creation 
of an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal or other comprehensive accountability 
mechanism. The Opposition also has not yet proposed the application of 
retroactive jurisdiction of the ICC, by which the (future, transitional) Syrian 
state would submit to the ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its 
jurisdiction taking place on Syrian territory from the onset of the conflict.336
The Assad regime, meanwhile, has rejected all claims for accountability for 
violations committed in the course of the conflict.  Indeed, the regime has 
refused to address the general issue of accountability for war crimes in any 
genuine way.337 Rather, the regime has focused attention exclusively on 
accountability for supposed “terrorists,” a term that the regime utilizes for 
entities that oppose the Assad government.338 The U.N., meanwhile, has 
taken a relatively tepid stance in the peace negotiations on issues relating to 
justice.  In fact, none of the U.N. mediators have ever called for direct 
accountability in the context of the U.N.-led peace negotiations.
2. The U.N. Security Council
Given the lack of intensive engagement by the parties in relation to 
accountability measures in the context of the peace process, as well as 
larger uncertainty on the geopolitical level, it was unclear in the early stages 
of the Syrian conflict which approach within the peace versus justice puzzle
would take hold. There were multiple efforts to introduce justice into the 
Syrian context via the U.N. Security Council, which reflected an early 
testing ground to determine which approach might come to take primacy in 
the Syrian conflict. However, few of these efforts at the U.N. Security
Council found success; following this failure to move forward with 
important accountability mechanisms, the peace-first approach took rapid 
hold over the Syrian peace process.
For instance, in 2014, some members of the U.N. Security Council put 
forth a draft resolution to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.339 The
resolution received widespread public support by member states of the 
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United Nations.340 Within the Security Council, thirteen of the Council’s 
fifteen member-states voted in favor of the resolution.341 However, both 
China and Russia vetoed the resolution.342
The U.N. Security Council has also attempted to lay the foundation for 
accountability in relation to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.343 In this 
regard the Security Council has experienced a mixed record.  While the 
Security Council has succeeded in taking steps that allow for a measure of 
information-gathering, Russia has constrained these efforts by exercising its 
veto power to prevent a strong foundation for accountability.344
In August 2015, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 2235 to 
establish a joint mission between the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanisms 
(JIM).345 The mandate of the OPCW-JIM was to identify those responsible 
for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.346 In August 2016 and again in 
November 2016, the OPCW-JIM presented reports that, for the first time, 
attributed responsibility for the use of chemical weapons inside Syria to the
Assad regime’s armed forces.347 In a subsequent report, the OPCW-JIM 
determined that the Assad regime was responsible for the use of chemical 
weapons in the infamous attack on Khan Sheikhun on April 4, 2017.348
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In relation to what would be done on the basis of attribution to the 
Assad regime, Virginia Gamba—the Head of the OPCW-JIM—declared
that the OPCW-JIM “believes that those with effective control in the 
military units referred to in this report or others responsible for the use of 
chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic must be held 
accountable.”349 To support such accountability, the OPCW-JIM had the 
authority to conduct further investigations to determine the specific 
individuals involved in perpetrating or organizing the particular incidents in 
question.350
In response to this growing momentum towards accountability for the 
Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons, Russia cast a veto in 
October 2017 to prevent the renewal of the OPCW-JIM’s mandate (which 
was scheduled to expire in mid-November 2017).351 As a result of the 
Russian veto, this second potential avenue for accountability through the 
UN Security Council was halted.352 From this pivotal point, the Syrian 
peace process evolved into a heavily peace-first oriented approach.
3. The U.N. General Assembly
In addition to efforts by the U.N. Security Council to introduce 
mechanisms for justice into the Syrian context, the U.N. General Assembly 
has created two primary initiatives.  The first is the U.N. Commission of 
Inquiry (COI), which is mandated to investigate the commission of 
atrocities.  The second is the International, Impartial, Independent 
Mechanism (IIIM), which was mandated to collect, analyze and preserve 
evidence of the commission of atrocities.353
The COI is a documentation mechanism with a mandate to investigate 
“all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011” 
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inside Syria.354 The COI has produced more than twenty reports since its 
inception in August 2011, documenting numerous violations of 
international law after interviewing thousands of witnesses and victims and 
analyzing significant physical evidence.355 Although the COI’s mandate 
and purpose represents a fundamentally important task in laying the 
foundation for future prosecutions, the COI has struggled to succeed.  
Indeed, in August 2017, Carla Del Ponte—former prosecutor for the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and one of the three members of the 
COI—resigned from the COI in protest of its failure to be effective.356 In 
particular, Ms. Del Ponte noted the serious impact of the COI’s limited 
powers—without a more sufficient mandate, in her view the COI has “no 
possibility of seeking justice for victims.”357 In addition, Ms. Del Ponte 
pointed to the inaction of the U.N. Security Council in response to the 
COI’s work.358 In describing her decision to leave the COI, Ms. Del Ponte 
said, “[i]t was all about the inaction of the security council because if you 
look at all the reports we have published, we have obtained nothing in terms 
of injustice.  It is unbelievable.”359
The IIIM is a mechanism under the purview of the U.N. General 
Assembly that was established in part due to Russia’s repeated veto of 
Security Council efforts to refer Syria to the ICC.360 The IIIM prioritizes 
the collection, analysis, and preservation of evidence of human rights 
violations and war crimes—as opposed to directly engaging in 
investigations of the acts themselves. 361 The COI is one of the many 
sources from which the IIIM obtains evidence. Additional sources for the 
IIIM include individuals, states, NGOs, and regional organizations. At the 
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present, the IIIM does not publicly disclose its findings and 
recommendations.362 The overarching policy of the IIIM is to essentially 
compile as much evidence of human rights violations and war crimes in
Syria as possible and share that information with groups seeking to 
prosecute those crimes once it has vetted them for commitment to similar 
goals and standards as the IIIM.363
The IIIM is designed to support other entities engaging in
prosecutorial efforts, including regional organizations and states pursuing 
options under universal jurisdiction, by sharing evidence with these 
entities.364 As a result, the IIIM could potentially increase the number of 
claims brought against perpetrators in Syria.365 The IIIM may also support 
any future prosecutions brought by the ICC in the event a new Syrian 
government submits to its retroactive jurisdiction, or prosecutions brought 
by a future hybrid court for Syria.366 Alternatively, if the IIIM deems that 
no such prosecution will effectively come to pass, the IIIM could release 
the information as part of a truth commission.
4. Civil Society
In addition to justice efforts put forth by the U.N., civil society has 
taken steps to introduce justice mechanisms into the Syrian context.  In 
particular, despite the obstacles to direct accountability in the short-term, a 
range of groups are engaging in efforts to at the least establish a record of 
violations, and potentially to support future efforts for justice.367 Given the 
advent of new technology combined with burgeoning political will and 
resourcing, efforts to generate and preserve documentation have 
proliferated.368 In particular, civil society groups have utilized complex 
documentation mechanisms that could support accountability as well as a 
range of expanded justice mechanisms, including reparations, truth-telling, 
and memorialization.369 Taken in combination with U.N. documentation 
efforts such as those pursued by the COI, civil society documentation 
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efforts have contributed to a relatively rich pool of documentation material 
to support various future justice-related efforts.
For instance, the Commission for International Justice and 
Accountability (CIJA), is an international NGO that has been heavily 
engaged in gathering and processing a significant pool of evidence relating 
to atrocity crimes.370 In the course of its work, CIJA has gained access to 
more than 700,000 pages from Syrian Government’s Intelligence and 
Security agencies.371 The purpose of CIJA is to lay the foundation for 
future prosecution “along the lines of Nuremberg,” according to its 
Executive Director.372
Similarly, The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is 
another entity that gathers intensive documentation in relation to atrocity 
crimes in Syria.373 SJAC analyzes the materials that it receives according to 
international law, with the purpose of promoting justice and accountability, 
and preserving evidence in order to “advance transitional justice and peace-
building.”374
Furthermore, the Syrian Accountability Project (SAP) is an 
internationally-recognized platform that is documenting war crimes and 
crimes against humanity taking place in the Syrian context.375 The project 
is led by David Crane, the former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.376 In addition to gathering documentation, SAP analyzes the 
collected materials with reference to such relevant legal frameworks as 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and domestic 
Syrian criminal law.377
These efforts, while not in and of themselves necessarily sufficient for 
a comprehensive justice initiative, could provide fundamental support for 
diverse accountability mechanisms in the future.
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5. Regime Defectors
Defectors from the Assad regime have also contributed significantly to 
the tapestry of justice mechanisms taking place in the Syrian context.  The 
“Caesar Photographs,” for instance, is a particularly striking documentation 
and awareness effort.378 A former Assad regime forensic photographer, 
who is called by the alias “Caesar,” smuggled more than 55,000 photos of 
the bodies of detainees tortured or starved to death by the Assad regime.379
The photographs were a component of the Syrian security branch’s efforts 
to develop a formal record of deaths in their detention centers; each body is 
marked with an identification number. 380 The photographs have been 
highly effective as awareness-raising tools and establish a poignant record 
of atrocities taking place in Syrian.  The photographs have already been 
utilized to support justice efforts. For example, in Spain, a case was lodged 
against the Syrian government for “state terrorism” on the behalf of a 
Syrian-Spanish woman who recognized her brother among the photographs 
of victims. 381 Although the case itself has not resulted in a clear 
prosecutorial path, this step illustrates the potential utility of the 
photographs—and other related documentation efforts—in supporting 
future prosecutorial efforts, if and when the time is right.
These efforts to document atrocity crimes support preparation for 
future prosecutions, whether by the ICC, by a future hybrid tribunal, or by 
third party states under a theory of universal jurisdiction (discussed further 
below).  The justice-related impacts of the Caesar project have already 
reverberated among policy makers, for instance prompting the United 
States Senate to introduce a bill in April 2017 after the Khan Sheikhoun gas 
attack by the Syrian regime.382 Among the measures included within the 
bill, was the call to establish a hybrid court for Syria to prosecute Assad and 
his regime.383 The bill was modeled on a previously-produced draft statute 
known as the “Chautauqua Blueprint” for an extraordinary tribunal for 
atrocity crimes in Syria, drawn up by chief prosecutors of several 
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international criminal tribunals under the initiative of the Public 
International Law & Policy Group.384
6. Universal Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most creative of current efforts to pursue accountability in 
Syria is the steadily growing list of countries that are attempting to use 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for atrocities. 385
Universal jurisdiction is the legal construct, which provides that any 
national court in any country can prosecute any individual from any country 
for the gravest of international law crimes, including “crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture.” 386 Although specific 
procedures vary, typically the prosecuting state needs the defendant to be 
within its territory before its domestic courts have the power to arrest and 
try that person.387 Prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases poses several 
steep logistical obstacles, such as gathering evidence and compelling 
appearances, which have rendered it an inefficient or otherwise morally 
questionable practice, even if it is occasionally an effective means of 
pursuing justice.388
In the Syrian context, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Spain have had moderate successes with prosecuting certain individuals 
from the Assad regime’s security forces, but have been unable to detain or 
convict higher-level officials or military officers.389 In the Spanish context, 
a case was filed against nine high-ranking security officers of the Assad 
regime, but the case was dismissed before it could go to trial due to 
domestic interpretation of the Spanish court’s jurisdiction. 390 In the 
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Swedish context, meanwhile, a successful prosecution was completed, 
although the individual in question was a relatively low-level Syrian 
perpetrator and the evidence was sufficient to convict only for violating 
human dignity, as opposed to a crime attached to more serious 
punishment.391 In Germany, criminal complaints have been filed against 
high-level members of the Assad regime, under a theory of universal 
jurisdiction.392 The outcome of these complaints remains to be seen.  In 
general, both the evidentiary collection problem and the means to compel 
suspects to appear before courts that are asserting universal jurisdiction
continue to be challenges in Syria.
7. The International Criminal Court
Syria has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute, thus precluding the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes being committed in Syria.393
Although Syria could be referred to the ICC via U.N. Security Council 
referral, as set forth above, such a referral was vetoed by Russia and China 
in 2014 394 and almost certainly would be vetoed again.  However, 
eventually, it may be possible to make use of retroactive ICC jurisdiction.  
When Assad does finally depart Syria (one way or another), the Syrian 
people, and the international community could pressure the new Syrian 
government to ratify the Rome Statute, and then prosecute Assad and other 
high-level perpetrators implicated in the Syrian war at the ICC.395
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there are no easy answers in regard to the Syrian crisis, or 
to the fundamental puzzle of peace, justice, and the potential combination 
thereof.  The case of Syria illustrates an immense weight of international 
crime balanced against the impossibility of immediate options for direct 
accountability—balanced, on the other side, against the immense 
importance of securing peace and halting hostilities.  Ultimately, the last 
chapter on accountability in Syria remains to be written.  Although after an 
initial period of certainty, the Syrian context thus far has come to reflect the 
predominance of a peace-first approach.  Yet, the record is clear that, if 
nothing else, justice is persistent. Moreover, given the rich array of players 
in the Syrian context paired with the intensity of the conflict, sustainable 
peace is likely to be elusive without at least a measure of justice.  The 
tilting balance, however, of both how much justice, and the nature of that 
justice, is unclear.  It is possible that Syria will go the path of Colombia, 
with a mechanism that focuses, in its essence, on the transitional elements 
of justice.  Alternatively, Syria may take on the Sierra Leonean model, with 
prosecutions for the most high-ranking perpetrators, and alternative 
mechanisms for mid-to-low-level perpetrators.  Appeasement is unlikely to 
win the day in Syria, and although it is likely that a “justice-first” approach 
is no longer truly feasible in this challenging context, the menu of options 
for weaving justice into peace remain. It is possible that, through these, the 
long arm of justice will eventually reach the Syrian context.
